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Oil price shocks, fuel subsidies and macroeconomic (in)stability in 
Nigeria 
 
Babatunde S. Omotosho1 
This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks and the extant fuel 
subsidy regime for Nigeria. To do this, we develop and estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE 
model that accounts for pass-through effect of international oil price into the retail price of 
fuel. Our results show that oil price shocks generate significant and persistent impacts on 
output, accounting for about 22 percent of its variations up to the fourth year. Under our 
benchmark model (i.e. with fuel subsidies), we show that a negative oil price shock contracts 
aggregate GDP, boosts non-oil GDP, increases headline inflation, and depreciates the 
exchange rate. However, results generated under the model without fuel subsidies indicate 
that the contractionary effect of a negative oil price shock on aggregate GDP is moderated, 
headline inflation decreases, while the exchange rate depreciates more in the short-run. 
Counterfactual simulations also reveal that fuel subsidy removal leads to higher 
macroeconomic instabilities and generates non-trivial implications for the response of 
monetary policy to an oil price shock. Thus, this study cautions that a successful fuel subsidy 
reform must necessarily encompass the deployment of well-targeted safety nets as well as the 
evolution of sustainable adjustment mechanisms. 
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JEL classification: E31, E32, E52, E62 
  
1.0 Introduction 
There is a large body of research investigating the macroeconomic implications of oil 
price shocks as well as the role of fuel subsidies, especially in resource-rich emerging 
economies (Adenikinju, 2009; Adeniyi et al., 2011; Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012; 
Berument et al., 2010; Coady et al., 2017; Krane and Monaldi, 2017). The interest in 
this area of research grew following the work of Hamilton (1983), which showed that 
seven out of the eight post-World War II recessions were preceded by significant oil 
price increases. Almost four decades after Hamilton (1983), empirical evidence still 
abounds regarding the non-trivial influence of oil price shocks on both domestic 
economies and the global economy at large (Fueki et al., 2018). In order to ameliorate 
the welfare and macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks, fuel subsidy programmes 
have been implemented in several countries, especially the oil-producing ones (Di 
Bella et al., 2015; Estache and Leipziger, 2009). 
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In recent times, however, there has been an increasing call for fuel subsidy reforms 
globally as policy-makers have expressed concerns regarding the efficacy of such 
programmes as well as its implications for fiscal sustainability2 (see, for example, 
Sdralevichet et al, 2014; Coady et al., 2015; Ebeke and Ngouana, 2015; Jakob et al., 
2015; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2015). It has also been argued that, contrary to its intention, 
badly-targeted subsidy programmes have worsened the problem of inequality. 
Consequently, a subset of the literature on oil-macroeconomy relationship has focused 
on the potential impacts of fuel subsidy reforms on domestic economies of oil-
producing countries (Alleyne and Hussain, 2013; Anand et al., 2013; Clements et al., 
2013; Calvo-Gonzalez et al., 2015; Breton and Mirzapour, 2016; Dennis, 2016). Our 
research falls within this strand of the literature, taking the case of Nigeria. 
Oil plays important roles in the Nigerian economy, contributing about a third of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1980s and 1990s. Although its share of 
the economy has waned in the subsequent decades due to declining oil prices and the 
changing structure of the economy, the oil and gas sector still accounts for about 11.2 
per cent of the GDP in the current decade (Table 1). Also, the contribution of oil to 
government revenue has remained quite high, increasing from 70.2 per cent during the 
1980s to about 80.0 per cent in the last decade. In terms of trade, oil accounts for about 
93.1 per cent of exports and 24.4 per cent of imports during the period 2010-20183. 
Against this backdrop, several studies have investigated the macroeconomic impacts 
of oil price shocks on the Nigerian economy. Amongst other effects, it has been shown 
that oil price shocks generate significant implications for output, prices, exchange rate, 
government revenues, interest rates and external reserves (Adeniyi et al., 2011; Akinlo, 
2012; Akinleye and Ekpo, 2013; Abayomi et al., 2015; Abdulkareem and 
Abdulhakeem, 2016; Aigheyisi, 2018; ). However, only a few attempts have been 
made at studying the role of fuel subsides and the macroeconomic implications of its 
removal (Adenikinju, 2009). 
 
As in many other resource-rich countries, the Nigeria government introduced a fuel 
subsidy regime as part of strategies for cushioning the macroeconomic impacts of oil 
price shocks on the economy. Under this arrangement, the government regulates the 
domestic price of fuel and pays domestic marketers the difference between the 
regulated domestic price and the Expected Open Market Price (EOMP), which is 
 
2 Clements et al., (2013) lists the consequences of fuel subsidies to include: aggravating fiscal 
imbalances, crowding-out priority public spending, and depressing private investment, distorting 
resource allocation by encouraging excessive energy consumption, and accelerating the depletion of 
natural resources, amongst others. 
3 About 91 per cent of Nigeria’s fuel requirement is imported from the rest of the world due to poor 
domestic refining capacity. 
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determined by the Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA)4. It is 
estimated that about N10 trillion was spent in fuel subsidy payments during the period 
2006-2018 (Budgit, 2019). 
Table 1: Oil and the Nigerian economy, 1980 – 2018 
 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018 
Share of oil in GDP 
(%) 
31.23 31.99 24.07 11.21 
Share of oil in govt. 
revenue (%) 
70.19 77.11 79.85 64.77 
Share of oil in total 
exports (%) 
95.14 97.35 96.97 93.05 
Share of fuel in total 
imports (%) 
8.39 20.12 21.30 24.41 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin 
Many studies have focused on examining the implications of fuel subsidy for the 
Nigerian economy. For instance, Umar and Umar (2013) and Siddig et al. (2014) noted 
that Nigeria’s subsidy regime distorts fiscal planning, encourages inefficient 
consumption, and increases inequality as richer households benefit more. Siddig et al. 
(2014) further showed that subsidy reduction increases the GDP and reduces 
household income. It has also been shown that fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria could 
cause inflation and reduce economic welfare (Adenikinju, 2009); hurt economic 
growth and reduce household income (Ocheni, 2015); and make firms less competitive 
(Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). These studies applied either the computable general 
equilibrium model (Siddig et al., 2014; Adenikinju, 2009), analysis of survey data 
(Ocheni, 2015), or the narrative approach (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012).  
In this paper, we argue that assessing the macroeconomic implications of oil price 
shocks and subsidy reforms requires a good understanding of the pass-through effects 
of oil price shocks to domestic fuel price5. Thus, we depart from previous studies by 
estimating the pass-through effect of oil prices into domestic fuel price within a general 
equilibrium framework prior to investigating the impacts of oil price shocks. To our 
knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt at incorporating fuel subsidy into a 
 
4 This agency was established in 2003 to amongst others design the pricing policy of petroleum 
products in Nigeria 
5 While the domestic retail fuel price is administered by the federal government, the effective price paid 
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amplified during periods of product scarcity as there is lack of institutional capacity to enforce country-
wide compliance by fuel retailers. To capture this reality, we assume that part of the changes to 




Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for Nigeria and estimating 
the pass-through effect of oil prices into domestic fuel price. Thus, we make empirical 
contributions to the existing literature. Next, we investigate the potential implications 
of fuel subsidy removal on the Nigerian economy by simulating our estimated model 
under alternative assumptions regarding the size of the pass-through effect. In other 
words, we simulate two economies: one with fuel subsidies (i.e. incomplete pass-
through) and the other without fuel subsidies (i.e. complete pass-through). Thus, the 
objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of oil price shocks on Nigeria’s 
macroeconomy and investigate the effects of fuel subsidy removal on key 
macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption, inflation and the real effective 
exchange rate. 
The paper is organized into five sections. In the next section, we present a DSGE model 
for a resource-rich, resource-dependent emerging economy in the fashion of Gali and 
Monacelli (2005) and Medina and Soto (2007)6. Thus, the economic environments 
within which the model agents operate as well as the optimality conditions guiding 
their decisions are described in the section. In the third section, the estimation 
procedure as well the data used for the empirical investigation are discussed. The 
estimation results, including the impulse responses and variance decompositions are 
presented in section four while section five concludes the paper with policy 
implications. 
 
2.0 The Model 
The model we develop in this paper is an extension of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and 
it incorporates: (i) an oil sector that is owned by government and foreign investors as 
in Algozhina (2015); (ii) oil in household consumption basket and firms’ production 
technology as in Medina and Soto (2005) and Allegret and Benkhodja (2015); (iii) an 
inefficient financial sector as in Smets and Wouters (2007); (iv) fiscal policy rule as in 
Algozhina (2015); (v) a fuel pricing rule that connotes an implicit subsidy regime as 
in Allegret and Benkhodja, (2015); and (vi) non-Ricardian consumers to capture credit 
constraints7. Furthermore, we allow for the law of one price gap in imports and by 
implication assume incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices 
(Monacelli, 2005; Senbeta, 2011). Finally, we allow for nominal and real rigidities 
including wage and price stickiness; consumption habits; and investment adjustment 
costs. There are seven agents operating in the economy: households, non-oil 
 
6 The use of New Keynesian models has gained significant prominence as the standard workhorse 
for understanding business cycle fluctuations and conducting monetary policy analysis (Medina and 
Soto, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007). Some previous applications of DSGE models to Nigerian data 
include Alege (2012); Olayeni and Olabode (2013); Adebiyi and Mordi (2016); and Iklaga (2017). 
7 A survey conducted in 2018 showed that about 36.8 per cent of adults in Nigeria are financially 
excluded that year (EFInA, 2018). 
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intermediate goods producers, final goods producers, oil firm, importing firms, 
government, and the central bank. In what follows, we discuss the economic 
environments within which each of the agents operates as well as the rules guiding 
their decisions. 
2.1 Households 
The economy is populated by Ricardian (R) and non-Ricardian (NR) households. The 
former represents a fraction (𝛾𝑅) of households who have access to the financial 
markets and are capable of inter-temporal optimisation. On the other hand, the latter 
category, NR, are financially-constrained and completely consume their labour income 
within the period (Gabriel et al., 2010). However, both categories share identical 
preferences as the representative household j derives utility from private consumption, 𝐶𝑡, as well as government consumption, 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 and dis-utility from labour, 𝑁𝑡. Thus, they 
seek to maximise the expected discounted utility function 
𝑈0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝑠  [(𝐶𝑡+𝑠(𝑗) − ∅𝑐𝐶𝑡+𝑠−1)1−𝜎1 − 𝜎 − 𝑁𝑡+𝑠(𝑗)1+𝜑1 + 𝜑  + ℎ(𝐺𝑐,𝑡+𝑠)] ,∞𝑠=0         (1) 
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, 𝜎 is relative risk aversion coefficient, and 𝜑 > 0  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. 𝐸0 denotes the mathematical 
expectation operator. The utility derived by household from government spending, 
h(Gc,t), is taken as given. Household consumption is subject to external habit 
formation, where the parameter ∅𝑐 ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of consumption habit.  
Household consumption is a composite index comprising core (non-oil) consumption 
bundle, 𝐶𝑛,𝑜,𝑡(𝑗), and fuel (oil) consumption, 𝐶𝑂,𝑡(𝑗). Expenditure minimization by 
each household yields the optimal demand for core and fuel consumption bundles as 
follows:                  𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) = (1 − 𝛾𝑜) [𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ]−𝜂𝑜 𝐶𝑡(𝑗),  𝐶𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) = 𝛾𝑜 [𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ]−𝜂𝑜 𝐶𝑡(𝑗), 
where parameter 𝜂𝑂 > 0 measures the degree of substitution between core and fuel 
consumption and 𝛾𝑂 represents the share of fuel consumption, 𝐶𝑂,𝑡(𝑗) in domestic 
consumption. The price of fuel and core goods are denoted as 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡, 
respectively, and 𝑃𝑡  is the aggregate consumer price index. The domestic price of fuel, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 is regulated based on a fuel pricing rule that is discussed in section 2.6.  
Similarly, the core consumption bundle, 𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) combines imported bundle, 𝐶𝑓,𝑡(𝑗) 
and domestically produced goods, 𝐶ℎ,𝑡(𝑗). Households’ expenditure minimisation 
subject to the composite index for the goods yields the optimal demands for 𝐶𝑓,𝑡(𝑗) 




𝐶ℎ,𝑡(𝑗) = (1 − 𝛾𝐶) [ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡]−𝜂𝐶 𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗),  𝐶𝑓,𝑡(𝑗) = 𝛾𝐶 [ 𝑃𝑓,𝑡𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡]−𝜂𝐶 𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗), 
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 represents the price of domestically produced goods and 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is the domestic 
price of imported goods. The parameter 𝜂𝐶 > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign goods in the core consumption basket while 𝛾𝐶  indicates 
the degree of openness of the domestic economy. The headline consumer price index 
(CPI), 𝑃𝑡, and its core counterpart, 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡, are standard: 𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − 𝛾𝑂)𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡1−𝜂𝑂 + 𝛾𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡1−𝜂𝑂] 11−𝜂𝑂 ,  𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡 = [(1 − 𝛾𝐶)𝑃ℎ,𝑡1−𝜂𝐶 + 𝛾𝐶𝑃𝑓,𝑡1−𝜂𝐶] 11−𝜂𝐶 . 
2.1.1 Ricardian households 
Each household j in this category can buy and sell financial assets without any form of 
constraints. Thus, the representative household makes inter-temporal decisions by 
maximising equation (1) subject to the following per period budget constraint 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑅(𝑗) + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐵𝑡+1(𝑗)𝑅𝑡𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡𝐵𝑡+1∗ (𝑗)𝑅𝑡∗𝜇𝑡∗= 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑅(𝑗) + 𝑅ℎ,𝑡𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐵𝑡(𝑗) + 𝜖𝑡𝐵𝑡∗(𝑗) + 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑇𝑋𝑡.              (2) 
where the superscript R indicates that the household is Ricardian. On the income side 
of equation (2), the representative Ricardian consumer supplies 𝑁𝑡𝑅(𝑗) hours of work 
at a nominal wage rate, 𝑊𝑡, and earns a labour income, 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑅(𝑗). It also earns capital 
income, 𝑅ℎ,𝑡𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑗) by leasing an amount of non-oil capital, 𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑗), to the domestic 
non-oil firms at a rental rate, 𝑅ℎ,𝑡. Each household enters the period with a stock of 
nominal domestic bonds, 𝐵𝑡(𝑗), and foreign bonds, 𝐵𝑡∗(𝑗) maturing in period 𝑡 + 1. 
The domestic bond pays a gross nominal rate of return, 𝑅𝑡 in domestic currency while 
its foreign counterpart pays an exchange rate (𝜖𝑡) adjusted nominal rate of return, 𝑅𝑡∗. 
Following Gupta et al., (2016) and Smets and Wouters (2007), we allow for domestic 
risk premium, 𝜇𝑡 over the monetary policy rate when households hold domestic assets 
as well as a stochastic disturbance term that represents the risk premium faced by 
households when borrowing abroad, 𝜇𝑡∗. The foreign and domestic risk premia are 
driven by AR(1) processes with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
innovations. The household receives an aliquot share, Dt from the profits of the firms. 
The income received is used to finance the purchase of consumption goods, 𝐶𝑡𝑅(𝑗), and 
non-oil investment goods, 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) at their respective prices, 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡. Finally, 𝑇𝑋𝑡 
represents per-capita lump-sum net taxes. 
As with consumption, non-oil investment goods, 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡, in equation (2) comprise home-
produced, 𝐼ℎ,𝑡, and foreign-produced, 𝐼𝑓,𝑡 with their respective optimal demands and 
price indices. The capital accumulation process is given by  
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𝐾ℎ,𝑡+1(𝑗) = (1 − 𝛿ℎ)𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗) [1 − 𝑆 ( 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗)𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1(𝑗))],                                    (3) 
where the parameter 0 < 𝛿ℎ < 1 represents the capital depreciation rate. The 
investment adjustment cost function is defined as: S ( 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗)𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1(𝑗)) = χ2 ( 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡(𝑗)𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1(𝑗) − 1)2 ,                                                    (4) 
where the parameter χ ≥ 0 governs the size of the adjustment cost. The representative 
Ricardian household maximises equation (1) subject to a per period nominal budget 
constraint (equation 2) and a capital accumulation process (equation 3). The relevant 
first order conditions yield the equations for consumption Euler, demand for foreign 
bonds, supply of capital, and demand for investment goods. 
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian households 
The second category of households are non-Ricardian – i.e. credit-constrained. They 
are therefore incapable of inter-temporal optimisation. Thus, the representative non-
Ricardian consumer j chooses its consumption, 𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑅(𝑗) by maximising a utility 
function that is similar to equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint: 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑅(𝑗) = 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑁𝑅(𝑗) − 𝑇𝑋𝑡.                                                         (5) 
2.1.3 Labour supply and wage setting 
We allow both the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households to determine their wages 
à la Calvo (1983). Thus, we assume that a fraction, 1 − 𝜃𝑤, of households is chosen at 
random to optimally reset their wages each period while the remaining fraction, 𝜃𝑤, 
stick to the wages determined previously. The optimal wage setting problem involves 
maximising equation (1) subject to the household budget constraints as well as the 
demand for the differentiated labour. The aggregate nominal wage rule is standard: 𝑊𝑡 = [𝜃𝑤𝑊𝑡−11−𝜂𝑤 + (1 − 𝜃𝑤)𝑊𝑡∎(𝑗)1−𝜂𝑤] 11−𝜂𝑤                                      (6) 
where 𝑊𝑡∎(𝑗) is the optimal reset wage, 𝜃𝑤 measures the degree of nominal wage 
rigidity, and 𝜂𝑤 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated jobs. The 
economy-wide consumption, 𝐶𝑡, and labour, 𝑁𝑡, for the Ricardian and non-Ricardian 
households are aggregated as follows: 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛾𝑅𝐶𝑡𝑅 + (1 − 𝛾𝑅)𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑅 ,  𝑁𝑡 = 𝛾𝑅𝑁𝑡𝑅 + (1 − 𝛾𝑅)𝑁𝑡𝑁𝑅 . 
2.2 Open economy features 
The interactions between the small open economy and the foreign economy is 
discussed next. Our exposition here follows Monacelli (2005) and Gali and Monacelli 




Real exchange rate, terms of trade and incomplete pass-through: We define the law 
of one price gap, 𝛹𝑡, as the ratio of foreign price index (expressed in domestic 
currency) to the domestic currency price of imports: 𝛹𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡𝑃𝑡∗𝑃𝑓,𝑡 ,                                                                                   (7) 
where 𝑃𝑡∗ is aggregate consumer price index of the foreign economy and 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is the 
average domestic price of imported goods. It is obvious that equation (7) takes the 
value of unity if the law of one price (LOP) holds. The real exchange rate, 𝑠𝑡, is defined 
as  𝑠𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡𝑃𝑡∗𝑃𝑡 .                                                                                 (8) 
The law of one price gap can be re-written by making use of equation (8) in (7) as 
follows: 𝛹𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑓,𝑡 ,                                                                                 (9) 
where 𝑝𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄  denotes the domestic price of imported goods in real terms. The 
terms of trade, 𝜏𝑡, is defined as the domestic currency price of imports relative to the 
export price (i.e. price of domestically produced tradable goods): 𝜏𝑡 = 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 𝑃ℎ,𝑡⁄ . 
International risk sharing: We link domestic consumption with foreign consumption 
by assuming that agents in the rest of the world have access to the same set of bonds 
and share the same preferences with their domestic counterparts. This assumption 
allows us to derive the international risk sharing equation by combining the Euler 
equations for both the domestic and foreign economies to yield  𝐶𝑡𝑅(𝑗) − 𝜙𝑐𝐶𝑡−1 = 𝜚𝑠𝑡1𝜎(𝐶𝑡∗(𝑗) − 𝜙𝑐𝐶𝑡−1∗ ),                                               (10) 
where the definition of the real exchange rate in equation (8) has been invoked and 𝜚 
represents a constant that depends on the relative initial conditions in asset holdings. 
2.3 Non-oil goods producing firms 
Final-good firms: These perfectly competitive firms produce final goods meant for 
the domestic market, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡, and the export market, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ , by bundling their respective 
differentiated intermediate goods, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ) and 𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ). Profit maximisation subject 
to the firms’ bundling technology yields a standard downward sloping demand 
function for intermediate inputs meant for domestic market (𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ)) and an 
analogous variant for goods meant for the export market (𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ)) as follows  𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ) = [𝑃ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ)𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ]−𝜖ℎ 𝑌ℎ,𝑡,           𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ) = [𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧𝐻)𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ ]−𝜖ℎ 𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗                 (11) 
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where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ) is the price charged on intermediate goods, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ), produced by an 
intermediate goods-producing firm, 𝑧ℎ. 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 is the domestic price index and the 
parameter 𝜖ℎ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among different intermediate 
goods. Also, the corresponding price aggregators for home goods meant for the 
domestic market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡) and the export market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ ) are given by: 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ)1−𝜖ℎ𝑑𝑧ℎ10 ] 11−𝜖ℎ    ,      𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ = [∫ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ)1−𝜖ℎ𝑑𝑧ℎ10 ] 11−𝜖ℎ 
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ) is the price charged on export-bound intermediate goods 𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ (𝑧ℎ) 
produced by an intermediate goods-producing firm, 𝑧ℎ. 
Intermediate goods-producing firms: A continuum of intermediate goods firms 
indexed by 𝑧ℎ ∈ (0,1), producing differentiated goods in a monopolistically 
competitive environment combine three inputs: capital – 𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ), refined oil - 𝑂ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ), and labour- 𝑁𝑡(𝑧ℎ) using a production technology:  𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ) = 𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝐾ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ)𝛼ℎ𝑘𝑂ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ)𝛼ℎ𝑜𝑁𝑡(𝑧ℎ)𝛼ℎ𝑛 ,                                                    (12) 
where 𝑌ℎ,𝑡(𝑧ℎ) is the output of the intermediate firm 𝑧ℎ, and the parameters 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑘 >0, 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑜 > 0 and 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑛 > 0 are elasticities of output with respect to capital, refined 
oil and labour inputs, respectively. Total factor productivity, 𝐴ℎ,𝑡, follows a first order 
autoregressive process with i.i.d innovations. Cost minimisation subject to equation 
(12) yields the firms’ optimal input combinations, while the corresponding real 
marginal cost is  𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 1𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝑝ℎ,𝑡 (𝑟ℎ,𝑡𝛼ℎ𝑘 )𝛼ℎ𝑘 (𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡𝛼ℎ𝑜 )𝛼ℎ𝑜 (𝑤𝑡𝛼ℎ𝑛)𝛼ℎ𝑛 ,                                            (13) 
where 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄  is the real marginal cost, 𝑟ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐻,𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄  is the real rental rate on 
capital, 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄  is the subsidised real domestic price of fuel, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄   is 
the real wage, and 𝑝ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 𝑃𝑡⁄  is the real price of domestically produced goods. Of 
note is the fact that the domestic price of fuel, 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡, features in the real marginal cost 
of the firms. Thus, administrative adjustments to 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 have consequential effects on 
firms’ marginal cost as well as their price-setting behaviour. As shown in sub-section 
2.6, the evolution of 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 is driven by a pass-through parameter (𝜈) that defines the 
extent to which changes in the international price of oil is translated to the retail price 
of fuel.  
Following Calvo’s (1983) staggered pricing model, each firm faces a probability (1 – 
θh) of optimally resetting its price every period while the remaining θh maintain the 




goods (equation 11) yields the optimal reset price for intermediate goods meant for the 
domestic market as 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∎ = 𝜖ℎ𝜖ℎ − 1 𝐸𝑡 ∑ (𝛽𝜃ℎ)𝑠𝑃ℎ,𝑡+𝑠𝑌ℎ,𝑡+𝑠𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠∞𝑠=0𝐸𝑡 ∑ (𝛽𝜃ℎ)𝑠𝑌ℎ,𝑡+𝑠∞𝑠=0                                         (14) 
where  𝜃ℎ ∈  [0, 1]  is an index of price stickiness and 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∎  represents the optimal reset 
price. Analogously, the optimal price for intermediate goods that are meant for the 
export market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗∎) exists with its associated Calvo parameter denoted by 𝜃ℎ,𝑓. The 
law of motion for domestic price level is:  𝑃ℎ,𝑡 = [𝜃ℎ𝑃ℎ,𝑡−11−𝜖ℎ + (1 − 𝜃ℎ)(𝑃ℎ,𝑡∎ )1−𝜖ℎ] 11−𝜖ℎ .                                         (15) 
2.4 Import goods retailers 
We allow for incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices in the short 
run (Medina and Soto, 2005)8. Thus, we consider a set of competitive assemblers that 
produce a final foreign-produced imported good, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡, which is consumed by 
households and also used for accumulating new capital goods. This set of competitive 
assemblers combine a continuum of differentiated imported varieties, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡(𝑧𝑓), sourced 
from import goods retailers. As in the case of domestic intermediate goods, the price 
of imported goods is determined à la Calvo (1983). Thus, an importing firm has a 
probability, 𝜃𝑓, of keeping the price of its good fixed in the next period and a 
probability, 1 − 𝜃𝑓, of optimally resetting its price. For a firm that can reset its 
price, the optimal reset price (𝑃𝑓,𝑡∎ ) is given by 
𝑃𝑓,𝑡∎ = 𝜖𝑓𝜖𝑓 − 1 𝐸𝑡 ∑ (𝛽𝜃𝑓)𝑠𝑃𝑓,𝑡+𝑠𝑌𝑓,𝑡+𝑠𝛹𝑡+𝑠∞𝑠=0𝐸𝑡 ∑ (𝛽𝜃𝑓)𝑠𝑌𝑓,𝑡+𝑠∞𝑠=0                                           (16) 
where the definition for the law of one price gap (equation 9) has been invoked in 
equation (16) and the parameter 𝜖𝑓 > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among 
different imported goods. 
2.5 Oil producing firm 
The oil firm operates under perfect competition, combining an extraction technology 
(𝐴𝑜,𝑡), materials sourced from the domestic economy (𝑀𝑡) and oil-related capital (𝐾𝑜,𝑡) 
to produce oil output (𝑌𝑂,𝑡). The produced oil is exported to the rest of the world at a 
price determined in the international crude oil market. The firm maximises its profit 
subject to a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas technology given by: 
 
8 We achieve this by introducing local currency pricing. 
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𝑌𝑂,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑂,𝑡𝐾𝑂,𝑡𝛼𝑜𝑘𝑀𝑡𝛼𝑜𝑚 ,                                                                       (17) 
where the parameters 𝛼𝑜𝑘 ∈  (0, 1) and 𝛼𝑜𝑚 ∈  (0, 1) represent the elasticities of oil 
output with respect to oil-related capital and material inputs, respectively. Following 
Algozhina (2015), we assume that oil-related capital, 𝐾𝑜,𝑡 is accumulated via foreign 
direct investment, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗, as follows: 𝐾𝑜,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑜)𝐾𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡, where δo 
represents the depreciation rate of oil-related capital. In turn, foreign direct investment 
responds to international oil price as follows: 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗ = (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡−1∗ )𝜌𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗ )1−𝜌𝑓𝑑𝑖 ,                                                            (18) 
where 𝜌𝑓𝑑𝑖 measures the degree of smoothing in the accumulation of 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗ and 𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗  is 
the international price of oil (in foreign currency) deflated by the foreign consumer 
price index.  𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗  and 𝐴𝑜,𝑡  are driven by AR(1) processes with exogenous shocks as 
follows: 𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗ = (𝑃𝑜,𝑡−1∗ )𝜌𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜀𝑡𝑝𝑜∗ ) ,  𝐴𝑜,𝑡 = (𝐴𝑜,𝑡−1)𝜌𝐴𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡𝐴𝑜) 
Finally, we assume that the oil firm is jointly owned by foreign direct investors and 
the government. Thus, it receives its profits net of royalties levied on production 
quantity at a rate 𝜏𝑜 as follows: 𝛱𝑡𝑜∗ = (1 − 𝜏𝑜)𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗ 𝑌𝑜,𝑡. 
2.6 Fiscal authority 
We assume the government respects a budget constraint given by 𝑇𝑋𝑡 + 𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1𝑅𝑡 .                                            (19) 
Government’s revenue sources include lump-sum tax, 𝑇𝑋𝑡; oil revenues, 𝑂𝑅𝑡; and 
issuance of one period bonds that results in a net debt position, 𝐵𝑡. On the expenditure 
side, government consumes public goods, 𝐺𝑐,𝑡, at a price index, 𝑃𝑔,𝑡, and makes 
subsidy payments, 𝑂𝑆𝑡. The implicit subsidy expenditure results from an 
administrative decision by the government to regulate the domestic fuel price, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡. 
Since a substantial share of fuel consumed in the domestic economy is imported, we 
assume that the domestic price of imported fuel, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡,  is regulated based on a fuel 
pricing rule given by9  𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡−1)(1−𝜈)(𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡)𝜈 ,                                                              (20) 
where 𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 is the landing price of imported fuel and it is given by10 
 
9 This follows Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) 




𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡 𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗𝛹𝑡𝑜 .                                                                                (21) 
In equation (21), 𝑃𝑂,𝑡∗   is the foreign currency price of oil abroad, 𝜖𝑡 is the nominal 
exchange rate and 𝛹𝑡𝑜 is the law of one price gap associated with the import price of 
fuel. The evolution of 𝛹𝑡𝑜 is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with i.i.d innovations. 
In equation (20), the fuel pricing parameter 0 < 𝜈 < 1 measures the pass-through 
effect of oil prices into retail fuel price and governs the level of fuel subsidies. When 𝜈 = 1, there is full pass-through effect and the subsidy regime ceases to exist. On the 
other hand, 𝜈 = 0 implies complete price regulation. Thus, our simulations regarding 
fuel subsidy reforms are conducted based on different assumptions regarding the size 
of the fuel pricing parameter. The amount of fuel subsidy payment, 𝑂𝑆𝑡, in our model 
is given by the difference between the total cost of imported fuel, 𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡𝑂𝑡 , (in domestic 
currency) and the amount realised from fuel sales in the domestic economy, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡𝑂𝑡. 
Thus, 𝑂𝑆𝑡 = (𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡)𝑂𝑡,                                                                     (22) 
where 𝑂𝑡 denotes the total volume of imported fuel used up by households and firms. 
In our model, government consumption represents a key instrument of fiscal policy. 
Its evolution (in log-linearised form) is given by: 𝐺𝑐,?̃? = 𝜌𝑔𝐺𝑐,𝑡−1̃ + (1 − 𝜌𝑔)[𝜔𝑦𝑜𝑦𝑜,?̃? − 𝜔𝑏𝑏?̃? + 𝜔𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑟?̃?] + 𝜀𝑡𝐺𝑐 ,              (23) 
where 𝜌𝑔 is the fiscal policy smoothing parameter, and 𝜔𝑦𝑜, 𝜔𝑏 and 𝜔𝑜𝑟 are 
government consumption feedback coefficients with respect to oil output, domestic 
debt and oil revenues, respectively. The feedback parameter with respect to oil output, 𝜔𝑦𝑜, defines the cyclicality of government spending. A positive value for the feedback 
parameter on output (𝜔𝑦𝑜 > 0) corresponds to pro-cyclical fiscal policy while a 
negative value (𝜔𝑦𝑜 < 0) indicates counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Also, fiscal policy is 
acyclical when 𝜔𝑦𝑜 > 0. The feedback parameter on debt, 𝜔𝑏 is assumed negative, 
implying that government current consumption declines with increased debt 
accumulation in the previous period. Consistent with the behaviour of most developing 
oil-rich countries, we assume that government consumption increases with increased 
oil revenues. Within this set-up, debt serves as a stabilising factor in the fiscal rule. 
The variables in tildes denote log deviations from their respective steady state values. 
We assume that the process for government spending shock, 𝜀𝑡𝐺𝑐 , is assumed i.i.d. The 
amount of oil revenue accruing to government is given by: 𝑂𝑅𝑡 = 𝜏𝑜𝜖𝑡𝑃𝑂,𝑡∗ 𝑌𝑂,𝑡,                                                                         (24) 
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where 𝜏𝑜 is the royalty rate on the quantity of oil production. Since the government 
budget constraint is cleared by fiscal debt, the equation for lump-sum taxes, 𝑇𝑋𝑡, is 
written in log-linearised form as: 𝑡𝑥?̃? = 𝜑𝑏𝑏𝑡−1̃ + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑐,?̃? + 𝜑𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑠?̃? − 𝜑𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑟?̃?. The 
parameters 𝜑𝑏, 𝜑𝑔, 𝜑𝑜𝑠 and 𝜑𝑜𝑟 represent the responses of lump-sum tax to fiscal debt, 
government consumption, fuel subsidy payments and oil revenue, respectively. 
2.7 Monetary authority 
In setting the short-term nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑡), the central bank follows a simple 
Taylor by gradually responding to aggregate inflation (𝜋𝑡), domestic output (𝑦ℎ,𝑡), and 
real exchange rate (𝑠𝑡) as follows: 𝑅?̃? = 𝜌𝑟𝑅𝑡−1̃ + (1 − 𝜌𝑟)[𝜔𝜋𝜋?̃? + 𝜔𝑦𝑦ℎ,?̃? + 𝜔𝑠𝑠?̃?] + 𝜀𝑡𝑟 ,                        (25) 
with the variables in tildes denoting log deviations from their respective steady state 
values while inflation is log-difference in aggregate consumer price index. The interest 
rate smoothing parameter is denoted by 𝜌𝑟, while 𝜔𝜋, 𝜔𝑦 and 𝜔𝑠 are the feedback 
coefficients on inflation, output and real exchange rate, respectively. The monetary 
policy shock, 𝜀𝑡𝑟, is assumed to follow an i.i.d process. 
2.8 Market clearing and aggregation 
Domestic non-oil output (𝑌ℎ,𝑡) is absorbed by domestic consumption (comprising 
households - 𝐶ℎ,𝑡, oil producing firms - Mt, and government - 𝐺ℎ,𝑡); non-oil exports 
(𝐶ℎ,𝑡∗ ); and domestic investment (𝐼ℎ,𝑡)11. Consequently, the domestic resource 
constraint in real terms is given by:  𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ,𝑡∗ + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐼ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐺ℎ,𝑡. On the other hand, aggregate real gross domestic 
product (GDP) comprises of both oil (𝑌𝑜,𝑡) and non-oil output (𝑌ℎ,𝑡). This is given by:  𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑜,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐼ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐺ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑥𝑡 . Real net exports (𝑛𝑥𝑡) represents the 
difference between total exports (𝑒𝑥𝑡) and imports (𝑖𝑚𝑡): 𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡 −  𝑖𝑚𝑡. The 
balance of payments (BOP) equation is given by 𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑡∗𝑅𝑡∗ = 𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑡−1∗ + 𝑛𝑥𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑜)𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑂,𝑡∗ 𝑌𝑂,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗.                         (26) 
while the labour and capital markets clear as follows:  
𝑁𝑡 = ∫ 𝑁𝑡𝑅(𝑗)𝑑𝑗10 + ∫ 𝑁𝑡𝑁𝑅(𝑗)𝑑𝑗10 , 𝐾𝐻,𝑡 = ∫ 𝐾𝐻,𝑡(𝑗)𝑑𝑗10 . 
 
 
11 Which is used to augment the stock of physical capital available for use in the production process in 




2.9 Rest of the world 
The demand for domestic goods by the foreign economy, 𝐶ℎ,𝑡∗ , is given by: 𝐶ℎ,𝑡∗ = 𝛾∗ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗𝑃𝑡∗ −𝜂∗ 𝐶𝑡∗,                                                                                    (27) 
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡∗  is the price of domestic goods in foreign currency, 𝑃𝑡∗ is the aggregate 
consumer price index in the foreign economy, and 𝐶𝑡∗ is aggregate foreign 
consumption. The parameter, 𝜂∗, represents the foreign price elasticity of demand for 
domestic goods while the share of domestic goods in foreign consumption is captured 
by 𝛾∗. The IS curve for the foreign economy is specified as: 1𝑅𝑡∗𝜇𝑡∗ = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 [(𝐶𝑡+1∗ (𝑗) − 𝜙𝑐∗𝐶𝑡∗𝐶𝑡∗(𝑗) − 𝜙𝑐∗𝐶𝑡−1∗ )−𝜎𝑐∗ 1 𝜋𝑡+1∗ ],                                         (28) 
where 𝜙𝑐∗ is the habit formation parameter in the foreign economy and 𝜎𝑐∗ is the relative 
risk aversion coefficient. The variables 𝐶𝑡∗, 𝑅𝑡∗ and  𝜋𝑡∗ represent consumption, interest 
rate and inflation rate in the foreign economy. The central bank in the foreign economy 
sets interest rate in a similar fashion as the domestic economy by following a Taylor 
rule given by 𝑅𝑡∗ = (𝑅𝑡−1∗ )𝜌𝑟∗ [(𝜋𝑡∗)𝜔𝜋∗ (𝑌ℎ,𝑡∗ )𝜔𝑦∗ ]1−𝜌𝑟∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡𝑟∗),                             (29) 
where 𝜌𝑟∗  represents the interest rate smoothing parameter in the foreign economy 
while 𝜔𝜋∗  and 𝜔𝑦∗  are the feedback coefficients with respect to inflation and output, 
respectively. The shock to foreign monetary policy is represented by 𝜀𝑡𝜋∗. Finally, 
inflation rate in the foreign economy is assumed to be given by: 𝜋𝑡∗ = (𝜋𝑡−1∗ )𝜌𝜋∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡𝜋∗)                                                                   (30) 
where 𝜌𝜋∗ is the persistence parameter for foreign inflation and 𝜀𝑡𝜋∗ is the 
corresponding shock.   
 
3.0 Model Estimation and Data 
The model is estimated via Bayesian methodology outlined in Schorfheide (2000). To 
do this, we solve a system of log-linear rational expectations equations of our model 
and express the solution as a vector autoregressive representation (VAR) in 𝑧𝑡: 𝑧𝑡 = 𝛤1(𝛺)𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝛤2(𝛺)𝜖𝑡,                                                       (31) 
where the coefficient matrices 𝛤1(𝛺) and 𝛤2(𝛺) are non-linear functions of the 
structural parameters of our model. Next, measurement equations are added in order 
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to link the observable variables to the vector of state variables, 𝑧𝑡. The measurement 
equation is written as: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝐻𝑧𝑡,                                                                     (32) 
where 𝑔𝑡 is a vector of observables that is of a lower dimension than 𝑧𝑡 and 𝐻 is a 
selection matrix. In our proposed model, the vector of observable variables is  𝑔𝑡 ≡ [𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑦𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑃𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑅𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠]′, 
while the remaining variables are considered unobserved. Based on equation (28), we 
construct the likelihood function for the structural parameters via Kalman Filter12. The 
likelihood density is then combined with the prior distribution of the parameters in 
order to obtain the posterior density function. In the final step, the posterior distribution 
of the parameters is derived numerically based on Metropolis-Hastings Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm. We then simulate 3 million draws from the random 
walk Metropolis-Hastings, discarding 30 per cent of the first draws as burn-in.  
The model is fitted to the datasets on eleven macroeconomic variables covering the 
period 2000Q2 - 2018Q213. These are headline Consumer Price Index (𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), core CPI 
(𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), real effective exchange rate (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), real GDP per 
capita (𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), real consumption per capita (𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), real investment per capita (𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠), the 
international price of oil (𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠) deflated by foreign price index, trade-weighted 
foreign real GDP per capita (𝑦𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠), trade-weighted foreign aggregate CPI (𝑃𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠), and 
trade-weighted foreign interest rate (𝑅𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠). The foreign variables are weighted based 
on Nigeria’s trade with her major trading partners: the Euro area, the United States, 
and India14. Dataset on the domestic variables are sourced from the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistics database. In order 
to derive per capita values for relevant domestic variables, we used the annual 
population figures to interpolate for the quarters. The data set for foreign variables as 
well as the international price of oil (𝑃𝑜,𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠) are retrieved from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis database (FRED) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the exception of interest rates, we 
transform the observables to their model consistent forms by taking their log-
differences. The interest rates are, however, expressed in quarterly terms. 
 
 
12 This is computed under the assumption of normally distributed disturbances. 
13 The choice of the estimation sample is largely influenced by data availability for the domestic 
economy. 
14 These three regions account for about 65 per cent of Nigeria’s total external trade over the last two 





3.1 Model parameters 
3.1.1 Parametrization 
Table 2 presents a list of calibrated parameters and their values. These parameters are 
derived from relevant sources, including typical values assumed for small open 
economies as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and resource-rich emerging economies 
such as Romero (2008), Ferrero and Seneca (2019), Iklaga (2017), and Omotosho 
(2019).  
We set the discount factor, 𝛽, equal to 0.99 (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 
2017); the depreciation rate, 𝛿ℎ, equal to 0.025 (Algozhina, 2015; Allegret and 
Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017); share of imports in household’s consumption, 𝛾𝐶, 
equal to 0.4 (Gali and Monacelli, 2005); share of imports in household’s investment, 𝛾𝐼, equal to 0.2; elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital, 𝛼ℎ𝑘, equal to 0.33 
(Algozhina, 2015; Rasaki and Malikane, 2015); elasticity of domestic output with 
respect to labour, 𝛼ℎ𝑛, equal to 0.55 (Ncube and Balma, 2017); elasticity of oil output 
with respect to capital, 𝛼𝑜𝑘, equal to 0.7 (Algozhina, 2015); elasticity of oil output with 
respect to materials, 𝛼𝑜𝑚 , equal to 0.3 (Algozhina, 2015; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019). 
Most of the parameters relating to fiscal policy and the fuel pricing rule are based on 
Algozhina (2015). 
Table 2: Calibrated parameters 
Parameter Definition Symbol Value 
  Discount factor                                                        𝛽 0.990 
  Depreciation rate                                                      𝛿ℎ = 𝛿𝑜 0.025 
  Share of imports in household's consumption                            𝛾𝑐 0.400 
  Share of fuel in household's consumption                               𝛾𝑜 0.085 
  Share of imports in household's investment                             𝛾𝑖 0.200 
  Relative initial conditions in asset holdings 𝜚 1.000 
  Calvo - wages                                                          𝜃𝑤 0.750 
  Elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital                  𝛼ℎ𝑘 0.330 
  Elasticity of domestic output with respect to oil                      𝛼ℎ𝑜 0.120 
  Elasticity of domestic output with respect to labour                   𝛼ℎ𝑛 0.550 
  Elasticity of oil output with respect to capital                       𝛼𝑜𝑘 0.700 
  Elasticity of oil output with respect to materials                     𝛼𝑜𝑚 0.300 
  Share of imports in government's consumption                          𝛾𝑔 0.120 
  Elasticity of sub. between foreign & domestic goods - Govt 𝜂𝑔 0.600 
  Response of public consumption to fiscal debt                          𝜔𝑏 0.300 
  Response of public consumption to oil revenue                          𝜔𝑜𝑟 0.800 
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  Response of lump-sum taxes to fiscal debt                              𝜑𝑏 0.400 
  Response of lump-sum taxes to government consumption                  𝜑𝑔 0.950 
  Response of lump-sum taxes to fuel subsidy payments                   𝜑𝑜𝑠 0.100 
  Response of lump-sum taxes to oil revenue                              𝜑𝑜𝑟 0.300 
  Habit formation parameter in foreign economy 𝜙𝑐∗ 0.000 
  Intra-temporal elasticity in foreign demand 𝜂∗ 0.790 
  Relative risk aversion coefficient in the foreign economy 𝜎𝑐∗ 1.000 
  Coefficient of inflation in Taylor Rule - foreign economy             𝜔𝜋∗ 1.500 
  Coefficient of output in Taylor Rule - foreign economy                𝜔𝑦∗ 0.500 
Implied steady state ratios 
  Consumption - output                                                   𝐶ℎ 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.690 
  Investment - output                                                    𝐼𝑛𝑜 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.150 
  Domestic materials - output                                            𝑀 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.010 
  Government consumption - output                                        𝐺𝑐 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.070 
  Export - output                                                        𝐶ℎ∗ 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.070 
  Import - output                                                        𝐼𝑀 𝑌ℎ⁄  0.150 
3.1.2 Prior moments 
Our assumptions regarding the prior distributions of the estimated parameters are 
presented in Table 3. The priors for the domestic economy are chosen based on 
calibration, the data and partly on Iklaga (2017). On the other hand, the foreign priors 
are based on Smets and Wouters (2007). In cases where we have limited information 
to form a credible prior, we impose less informative priors, allowing the data to 
determine the location of the parameter. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we set the 
autoregressive coefficients for the exogenous disturbances uniformly to follow beta 
distributions centered at 0.5. However, we assume larger standard deviations of 0.25 
in order to reflect our level of uncertainty about the assumed parameter values. In terms 
of the parameters of the shock processes, we assume an inverse gamma distribution 
with a mean of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 4.0, which is much higher than 2.0 in 
Smets and Wouters (2007).  
We assume that the proportion of Ricardian consumers (𝛾𝑅) is represented by a beta 
distribution with a mean of 0.6 and standard deviation of 0.10 (Iklaga, 2017; Ncube 
and Balma, 2017). The labour supply elasticity (𝜑) is set to 1.45 in line with Algozhina 
(2015) and assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a standard deviation of 0.1. 
The risk aversion parameter, 𝜎, is represented by an inverse gamma distribution with 
a mean of 2.0 (Iklaga, 2017). The external habit parameter (∅𝑐) is represented by a 
beta distribution with a mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1 (Iklaga, 2017) while 




with mean 4.0 and a relatively large standard deviation of 3.0 (Iklaga, 2017; Ncube 
and Balma, 2017).  
The reaction coefficients in the monetary policy function are assumed to follow 
gamma distributions with the coefficient for inflation (𝜔𝜋) centered at 1.5 while the 
coefficients for output (𝜔𝑦) and exchange rate (𝜔𝑠) are each set to 0.125 (Adebiyi and 
Mordi, 2016; Iklaga, 2017; Smets and Wouters, 2007). The fuel pricing parameter, 𝜈, 
is set to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.3 in line with Allegret and 
Benkhodja (2015). At 𝜈 = 0.3, we assume a pass-through effect of 30 per cent from 
international oil prices into retail fuel price.  
 
4.0 Results 
In this section, we present the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters and 
analyse the effects of oil price shocks on the Nigerian economy. We also show the 
results of our counterfactual simulations regarding the responses of the economy to an 
oil price shock under alternative assumptions regarding the pass-through effects of oil 
prices into domestic price of fuel.  
4.1 Posterior estimates 
Table 3 reports the posterior moments for the estimated structural, policy and shock 
parameters. The parameters in the utility function are estimated to be lower than their 
priors. For instance, at 𝜎 = 1.4, the estimated relative risk aversion parameter is lower 
than 2.0 initially assumed but slightly higher than 1.38 estimated by Smets and 
Wouters (2007) for the US economy. This implies that the savings/investment 
behaviour of households are more sensitive to structural shocks in Nigeria.  
Table 3: Priors and posterior estimates 
Parameter 
Prior distribution  Posterior distribution 
Density  Mean  
       Std. 
       Dev.  Mean  90% HPD Int. 
Structural parameters 
Ricardian consumers: 𝛾𝑅 Beta 0.60 0.10 0.692 0.562 - 0.824 
Labour supply elasticity: 𝜑 Gamma 1.45 0.10 1.439 1.274 - 1.600 
Relative risk aversion: 𝜎 Inv. Gamma 2.00 0.40 1.409 1.109 - 1.694 
External habit: 𝜙𝑐 Beta 0.70 0.10 0.438 0.310 - 0.568 
Investment adj. cost: 𝜒 Gamma 4.00 3.00 6.181 1.751 - 10.490 
Fuel pricing parameter: 𝜈 Beta 0.30 0.10 0.429 0.190 - 0.640 
Oil - core cons. elasticity: 𝜂𝑜 Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.188 0.044 - 0.328 
For. - dom. cons. elasticity: 𝜂𝑐 Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.609 0.287 - 0.926 
For. - dom. inv. elasticity: 𝜂𝑖 Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.615 0.286 - 0.933 
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Calvo - domestic goods: 𝜃ℎ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.719 0.620 - 0.826 
Calvo - imported goods: 𝜃𝑓 Beta 0.70 0.10 0.691 0.525 - 0.860 
Policy parameters 
Taylor rule - inflation: 𝜔𝜋 Gamma 1.500 0.20 2.857 2.579 - 3.141 
Taylor rule - output: 𝜔𝑦 Gamma 0.125 0.05 0.118 0.043 - 0.191 
Taylor rule - exch. rate:𝜔𝑠 Gamma 0.125 0.05 0.109 0.040 - 0.176 
Interest rate smoothing: 𝜌𝑟 Beta 0.500 0.25 0.224 0.054 - 0.382 
Fiscal policy cyclicality: 𝜔𝑦𝑜 Normal 0.400 0.50 0.351 -0.47 - 1.184 
Fiscal policy persistence: 𝜌𝑔 Beta 0.500 0.25 0.487 0.073 - 0.896 
Persistence of shocks      
Dom. productivity: 𝜌𝑎ℎ  Beta 0.5 0.25 0.771 0.593 - 0.957 
Oil productivity: 𝜌𝑎0 Beta 0.5 0.25 0.502 0.100 - 0.905 
Dom. risk premium: 𝜌𝜇 Beta 0.5 0.25 0.786 0.703 - 0.871 
Law of one price gap-oil: 𝜌𝜓𝑜 Beta 0.5 0.25 0.608 0.250 - 0.957 
Int'l oil price shock: 𝜌𝑝𝑜 Beta 0.5 0.25 0.923 0.827 - 0.987 
For. risk premium: 𝜌𝜇∗ Beta 0.5 0.25 0.859 0.790 - 0.929 
For. inflation: 𝜌𝜋∗ Beta 0.4 0.25 0.138 0.001 - 0.257 
For. monetary policy: 𝜌𝑟∗ Beta 0.5 0.25 0.442 0.303 - 0.584 
Standard deviation of shocks  
Dom. productivity: 𝜀𝑡𝑎ℎ  Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.246 0.105 - 0.407 
Oil productivity:𝜀𝑡𝑎𝑜 Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.076 0.024 - 0.133 
Dom. risk premium: 𝜀𝑡𝜇 Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.162 0.132 - 0.192 
Dom. fiscal policy:𝜀𝑡𝑔𝑐 Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.098 0.023 - 0.177 
Law of one price gap-oil: 𝜀𝑡𝜓𝑜 Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.904 0.444 - 1.490 
Dom. monetary policy: 𝜀𝑡𝑟 Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.379 0.300 - 0.455 
Int'l oil price shock: 𝜀𝑡𝑝𝑜∗  Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.151 0.130 - 0.171 
For. risk premium: 𝜀𝑡𝜇∗ Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.041 0.032 - 0.050 
For. inflation: 𝜀𝑡𝜋∗ Inv. Gamma 0.01 4 0.005 0.004 - 0.006 
For. monetary policy: 𝜀𝑡𝑟∗ Inv. Gamma 0.1 4 0.101 0.079 - 0.121 
The estimated labour supply elasticity (𝜑 = 1.44) is about the same value as its 
assumed prior of 1.45 while the estimated external habit parameter (∅𝑐) is 0.4, which 
is lower than the assumed prior of 0.7. The posterior mean for the share of Ricardian 
consumers (𝛾𝑅) is 0.69. This is higher than the estimate of 0.62 obtained by Iklaga 
(2017) for the period 2003-2015. The estimated Taylor rule indicates that the Central 




and the exchange rate. The CBN’s reaction coefficient on inflation (𝜔𝜋) is estimated 
at 2.86, which is substantially higher than the prior (1.50), the 1.45 obtained by Iklaga 
(2017) and 1.405 estimated for an oil-importing economy of South Africa by 
Hollander et al. (2018). At 𝜔𝑦 = 0.12, output considerations carry a higher weight in 
the Taylor rule than exchange rate (𝜔𝑠 = 0.11). The estimated interest rate smoothing 
parameter is low (𝜌𝑟 = 0.22), but comparable to the value of 0.21 obtained by Olayeni 
and Olabode (2013) for Nigeria over the period 1986-2004 and 0.26 obtained by 
Medina and Soto (2005) for the Chilean economy. The observed policy behaviour of 
the CBN is consistent with the findings of Olayeni and Olabode (2013) and Adebiyi 
and Mordi (2016).  
In terms of fiscal policy, our results provide evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy as 
the feedback parameter with respect to oil output (𝜔𝑦𝑜) in the government spending 
rule is estimated at 0.35. Also, the fiscal policy persistence parameter is estimated at 
0.49, which is slightly lower than the assumed prior of 0.5. 
Turning to the fuel pricing rule, which governs the dynamics of the fuel consumption 
subsidy regime, our results show that the government bears more than half of the 
effects of international oil prices on domestic fuel price under its subsidy programme. 
The estimated pass-through parameter (𝜈) is 0.43, which is higher than the value of 
0.30 initially assumed. This implies an incomplete pass-through of international oil 
prices into domestic fuel price, as expected of an economy with a fuel subsidy 
programme. This effort appears to be the first attempt at estimating this parameter for 
Nigeria. As earlier explained, our counterfactual simulations shown in sub-section 4.3 
are based on alternative assumptions regarding the pass-through parameter in the 
domestic fuel pricing rule. Our benchmark simulation corresponds to the estimated 
value of the pass-through parameter (𝜈 = 0.43) while the alternative scenario is based 
on a value of unity, implying complete pass-through of oil price shocks into retail fuel 
price. 
4.2 How important are oil price shocks? 
4.2.1 Historical decomposition 
In this sub-section, we analyse the historical decompositions of aggregate GDP, 
headline inflation, core inflation, real exchange rate and the interest rate over the 
sample period. For ease of presentation and analysis, we group the shocks under five 
categories: (i) oil shocks (comprising oil sector productivity, international oil price, 
and the law of one price gap for fuel); (ii) external shocks (comprising foreign 
inflation, foreign interest rate and external risk premium); (iii) domestic supply shocks 
(comprising domestic productivity and domestic risk premium); (iv) monetary policy 




Figure 1: Historical decomposition of output 
Figure 1 presents the historical decomposition of the five groups of shocks to the 
growth of aggregate GDP during the period 2000Q2-2018Q2. The improved output 
performances in the second half of years 2001 and 2005 were driven largely by positive 
oil shocks, a dovish monetary policy stance, and positive domestic supply shocks. We 
also observe that the second half of the last decade (2005 - 2010) was associated with 
relative stability in output growth with monetary policy shocks, domestic supply 
shocks and oil shocks playing significant roles. However, the poor output performance 
recorded in the third quarter of 2011 can be explained by negative domestic supply 
shocks as well as the hawkish stance of monetary policy in response to the inflationary 
pressures that resulted from the impacts of the 2008/09 global financial crisis. It is also 
clear from Figure 1 that negative oil and domestic supply shocks were the predominant 
sources of the negative output growth recorded in 2016. 
Figure 2 presents the historical decomposition of aggregate inflation. Oil shocks 
played prominent roles in the last decade (2000-2010) while monetary and domestic 
supply shocks are more relevant in the current decade. The observed inflationary 
pressures during the mid-2000s were driven by negative domestic supply shocks. Also, 
the increasing inflationary trend experienced during the second half of 2015 are 
attributable to negative domestic supply and monetary policy shocks.  
Figure 3 shows that oil shocks as well as monetary policy innovations played non-
trivial roles in the evolution of real exchange rate during the sample period. Prior to 
the 2008/09 global financial crisis, the exchange rate exhibited high volatility, which 
is mainly attributable to oil shocks and domestic supply shocks (i.e. total factor 
productivity). The sharp depreciation recorded during the global financial crisis was 




Bank of Nigeria. Thus, a combination of favourable oil prices and positive monetary 
policy innovations explained the appreciation of the exchange rate between 2009 and 
2010. Subsequently, the exchange rate remained relatively stable till the first half of 
2015 when a sharp depreciation was again recorded, owing to oil shocks, domestic 
supply innovations and external shocks.  
 
Figure 2: Historical decomposition of headline inflation 
 
Figure 3: Historical decomposition of real exchange rate 
The massive depreciation in the exchange rate in the period 2015-17 is principally 
explained by domestic supply shocks and oil-related disturbances. During this period, 
the oil price crashed from about US$102/barrel in the third quarter of 2014 to about 
US$50/barrel in the second quarter of 2017. This sort of significant crash generates 
non-trivial effects on general economic activities of a resource-rich, resource-
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dependent country, such as Nigeria. The massive reduction in oil earnings during 
2015-17 led to scarcity of foreign exchange, which led to a rapid depletion in Nigeria’s 
stock of external reserves. Faced with a near currency crisis situation, the CBN 
devalued the domestic currency (Naira) and restricted selected importers’ access to the 
official foreign exchange supply. Consequently, domestic producers were unable to 
effectively source for foreign exchange to meet their import needs for raw materials 
and machineries, causing a negative shock to domestic factor productivity. The 
massive depreciation was then followed by a correction in the exchange rate and some 
stability in the foreign exchange market, owing to a rebound in the price of crude oil 
in the third quarter of 2017 as well as a hawkish monetary policy stance of the CBN 
during the period. 
Finally, the historical decomposition of interest rate over the sample period is shown 
in Figure 4. Similar to the findings of Hollander et al. (2018) for the South-African 
economy, our results indicate that monetary policy and domestic supply (largely risk 
premium) shocks play non-trivial roles in the evolution of the nominal interest rate in 
Nigeria. Also, external shocks (i.e. foreign inflation and external risk premium shocks) 
play relatively significant roles in explaining the hawkish monetary policy stance of 
the CBN during the period of the global financial crisis.  
 
Figure 4: Historical decomposition of interest rate 
4.2.2 Forecast error variance decomposition  
In Table 4, we present the forecast error variance decompositions of aggregate output 
and the headline inflation over four different time horizons. We have maintained the 
grouping of the shocks as in sub-section 4.2.1. 
Table 4 shows that domestic supply shocks contribute about 46.4 per cent to variations 
in aggregate output within the first year (4 quarters). It is clear from the results that the 




56.42 per cent to its variations by the fourth year. In the short run, monetary policy 
constitutes the second most dominant shock, accounting for 29.5 per cent of output 
variations. Also, about a fifth of total variations in GDP is caused by oil shocks over 
the one-to-four year horizons. By the third and fourth years, oil shocks constitute the 
second most dominant shock driving the variations in aggregate GDP.  
Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition of selected variables 







Variance decomposition of aggregate GDP (% contribution) 
  Domestic supply shocks    46.43 55.80 56.76 56.42 
  External shocks           2.42 1.95 1.84 1.81 
  Oil shocks                21.73 20.04 20.65 21.58 
  Monetary policy shocks    29.46 21.95 20.50 19.95 
  Fiscal policy shocks      0.33 0.25 0.25 0.24 
Variance decomposition of headline inflation (% contribution)                 
  Domestic supply shocks    31.54 34.50 35.07 35.16 
  External shocks           26.39 25.22 24.98 24.92 
  Oil shocks                1.60 1.79 1.86 1.94 
  Monetary policy shocks    40.46 38.48 38.09 37.97 
  Fiscal policy shocks      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Variance decomposition of real exchange rate (% contribution)                 
  Domestic supply shocks    48.23 51.54 51.19 50.90 
  External shocks           16.56 15.41 15.13 14.86 
  Oil shocks                17.30 17.91 19.11 19.96 
  Monetary policy shocks    17.76 15.04 14.48 14.20 
  Fiscal policy shocks      0.14 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Variance decomposition of interest rate (% contribution)                 
  Domestic supply shocks    59.87 63.48 64.11 64.21 
  External shocks           32.37 29.26 28.72 28.60 
  Oil shocks                1.55 1.65 1.67 1.70 
  Monetary policy shocks    6.21 5.60 5.49 5.47 
  Fiscal policy shocks      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Headline inflation is largely driven by monetary policy shocks, confirming the efficacy 
of monetary policy in curbing inflationary tendencies in the country. The second most 
important shocks relate to domestic supply as they account for about a third of total 
variations in headline inflation across the different time horizons considered. As 
expected of a small open economy developed in this paper, external shocks account 
for about 26.4 per cent variations in the short-run and up to about 24.9 per cent by the 
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fourth year. Expectedly, the contribution of oil price shocks to headline inflation is 
quite miniscule, perhaps owing to the incomplete pass-through of international oil 
prices into domestic fuel price.  
Our results show that domestic supply shocks (total factor productivity and domestic 
risk premium) account for about 50.9 per cent of the total variation in real exchange 
rate over the 1-4 year horizon. However, in the first year, external shocks (foreign 
inflation, foreign interest rate and external risk premium shocks) and monetary policy 
innovations jointly explain about 34.32 per cent of its variation. Also, oil shocks 
account for a relatively substantial part of total variations in exchange rate over the 
horizons considered, ranging from 17.3 per cent in the first year to about 20.0 per cent 
up to the fourth year. By the fourth year, oil price shock is the second largest category 
of shock explaining the variations in exchange rate, after domestic shocks. 
Furthermore, our results show that domestic supply and external shocks are the key 
drivers of nominal interest rates, jointly accounting for over 90.0 per cent of the 
forecast variance across all the horizons considered. However, fiscal policy and oil 
price shocks contribute in a relatively negligible way. 
4.3 Oil price shocks, fuel subsidy and the economy 
4.3.1 Response of the economy to a negative oil price shock 
Figure 5 shows the estimated impulse responses of selected model variables to a one 
standard deviation (one-SD) negative international oil price shock. Following a decline 
in oil prices, the oil firms become less profitable, leading to a decline in their output 
and a reduction in the oil firms’ demand for materials sourced from the domestic 
economy (as implied by equation 17). In view of the size of the oil sector as well as 
the impacts of oil price declines on government consumption, aggregate GDP falls and 
the effect is quite persistent. However, private consumption rises as more income 
becomes available to households following a negative oil price shock– oil constitutes 
part of the consumption basket of the household in our model, implying that a decline 
in oil price releases more resources to households to spend.  
A negative oil price shock causes the non-oil sector to become relatively more 
attractive as more productive resources are directed from the oil to the non-oil sector. 
The inflow of productive resources into the non-oil sector as well as the increased 
private consumption and reduced marginal cost lead to an increase in non-oil GDP. 
However, the increase in non-oil output is suppressed initially due to the reduced 





Figure 5: Impulse responses to a one-SD negative oil price shock 
Since the price of fuel features in the real marginal cost equation of domestic firms 
(equation 13), a negative oil price shock generates lower marginal cost and leads to a 
fall in domestic inflation. However, the instrumentality of exchange rate pass-through 
causes import prices to rise following a depreciated exchange rate. The combined 
effects of a negative oil price shock on the prices of domestic and imported goods 
causes core inflation to increase. Thus, the increases in headline and core measures of 
inflation are induced by the depreciation in exchange rate. The monetary authority 
responds to the initial exchange rate-induced rise in headline inflation by embarking 
on an interest rate hike, a move that further exacerbates the contractionary effects of 
the negative oil price shock on the aggregate GDP. In a nutshell, a negative 
international oil price shock generates aggregate GDP contraction, increase in non-oil 
GDP, reduction in domestic inflation, exchange rate depreciation, increases in headline 
and core measures of inflation, and an interest rate hike in our small open resource-
rich economy.  
4.3.2 Macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy removal 
In this sub-section, we simulate two economies based on different assumptions 
regarding the size of the pass-through effect of oil prices into the retail price of fuel. 
The first economy is based on a benchmark model under which the fuel pricing 
parameter is set at 𝜈 = 0.43. The second economy is based on an alternative model 
simulated under an assumption of complete pass-through effect, such that 𝜈 = 1 (i.e. 
a no subsidy regime). The responses of the economy a decline in oil price (equivalent 
to a one-SD negative real oil price shock) under these two alternative economies are 
presented in Figure 6. 
Following a one-SD negative real oil price shock, aggregate GDP in the domestic 
economy contracts. However, the contraction under a model with fuel subsidies 
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(𝜈=0.43) is more severe in the short run. In other words, fuel subsidy removal 
ameliorates the contractionary effects of a negative oil price shock in our small open 
economy. Non-oil GDP increases in the aftermath of a negative oil price shock due to 
the associated lower real marginal cost faced by the firms as well as the increased 
aggregate demand arising from additional income that is available to consumers. Thus, 
private consumption rises. Similar to the case under aggregate GDP, better outcomes 
are recorded for non-oil GDP and private consumption under a model without fuel 
subsidies (𝜈=1) in line with the findings of Siddig et al. (2014). That is, the increases 
in non-oil output and private consumption associated with a negative oil price shock 
are higher under an economy without fuel subsidies, compared to the case for an 
economy with a fuel subsidy regime.   
 
Figure 6: Impulse responses under different assumptions regarding fuel subsidies 
Given a negative oil price shock, Figure 6 shows that domestic inflation declines more 
under a model without fuel subsidies (𝜈=1), owing to the complete pass-through effect 
of international oil prices into the retail price of fuel. Thus, the effects of the negative 
oil price shock are fully reflected in firms’ real marginal cost, leading to a downward 
adjustment in the prices of domestically produced goods. In other words, the fuel 
subsidy regime adds additional stickiness to the evolution of domestic prices, which 
causes domestic inflation to be rigid downwards. The behaviours of imported and core 
measures of inflation are quite similar in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 
However, the immediate impact of a negative oil price shock on headline inflation 
differs under the two models. Upon impact, headline inflation declines under the 
benchmark model following a negative shock to oil price while the decline is delayed 
under the alternative model. The delayed response of headline inflation under the 
alternative model can be explained by the price rigidity implied by the fuel subsidy 




fuel subsidies, the inflationary impacts of such depreciation on headline inflation is 
more than offset by the reduction in domestic inflation under such a regime (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝜈=1). 
On the other hand, the inflationary effects of exchange rate depreciation cause headline 
inflation to rise under the economy with fuel subsidies (𝜈=0.43) since domestic 
inflation is sticky downwards.  
Consequently, the monetary authority of an economy with a fuel subsidy regime 
increases interest rate following a negative oil price shock, a move that pushes the 
economy further into recession (Figure 6). On the other hand, the monetary authority 
of an economy without a fuel subsidy regime faces no inflation threats following a 
negative oil price. It, therefore, cuts rates in the bid to boost aggregate demand and 
increase domestic output. Of course, such a move causes an immediate exchange rate 
overshooting as against the case under the benchmark model where a delayed 
overshooting is observed (Figure 6). These results are useful in helping to understand 
the issues relating to the macroeconomic implications of potential fuel subsidy reforms 
in Nigeria.  
In order to investigate the level of macroeconomic instabilities associated with fuel 
subsidy removal, we report the variances of selected macroeconomic variables under 
the benchmark and alternative models in Table 5. It can be seen from the table that, 
given an oil price shock, the alternative model is associated with slightly higher 
volatility in aggregate GDP, headline inflation, core inflation, domestic inflation, real 
exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, non-oil GDP, private 
consumption, and imported inflation are insignificantly less volatile under a no subsidy 
regime.   
Table 5: Variances of selected macroeconomic variables under different assumptions 
regarding fuel subsidies 
Variable Benchmark (subsidy) Alternative (no Subsidy) 
Aggregate GDP 0.1769 0.1841 
Non-oil GDP 0.0281 0.0245 
Private consumption 0.1060 0.1016 
Headline inflation 0.0033 0.0038 
Core inflation 0.0055 0.0076 
Domestic inflation 0.0032 0.0046 
Imported inflation 0.0058 0.0053 
Real exchange rate 0.3208 0.3307 
Interest rate 0.0076 0.0089 
Overall, the results of our counterfactual simulations indicate that the extant fuel 
subsidy regime in the country has non-trivial implications for the economy’s response 
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to an oil price shock. In view of the macroeconomic instabilities observed under the 
alternative model, this paper cautions that potential future subsidy reforms must be 
conducted with due diligence. While the fiscal sustainability implications of the fuel 
subsidy programme remain a source of concern to policy makers, this paper calls for 
a more expansive study to assess such implications and evaluate the welfare impacts 
of potential subsidy reforms. 
 
5.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The debates around the macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks as well as the 
relevance of the extant fuel subsidy regime in Nigeria has remained intense over the 
years. At the global level, international organisations and policy makers have raised 
concerns regarding how well-targeted energy subsidies have been, especially with 
regards to protecting the poor segment of the society. Those who believe that energy 
subsidies have outlived their usefulness have called for its abolition in order to free up 
fiscal resources for economic development. In Nigeria, while the fuel subsidy debate 
continues to gather steam, studies addressing the welfare and macroeconomic 
implications of its removal are still relatively scanty.  
Results from our estimated DSGE model show that the pass-through effect of 
international oil prices into domestic fuel price is about 43 per cent. We indicate that 
the size of the pass-through parameter governs the dynamics of fuel subsidy payments 
in the country and simulated two models based on different assumptions regarding the 
parameter: (i) 𝜈=0.43, corresponding to an economy with a subsidy regime, and (ii) 𝜈=1.0, corresponding to an economy without a fuel subsidy regime. Our results show 
that oil price shocks have non-trivial implications for output, prices and interest rate in 
our small open economy. While a negative oil price shock leads to a contraction in 
aggregate GDP, the severity of the contraction is amplified under the model with fuel 
subsidies. The paper, however, notes that retaining the subsidy programme has some 
appeal in terms of its ability to generate relative macroeconomic stability, compared 
to the case under a no-subsidy regime.  
Although the subsidy regime is useful for stabilising the domestic economy, its effects 
on long run growth, agent’s welfare and government’s fiscal operations require further 
investigation. The findings of such investigation would provide useful insights relating 
to the fiscal sustainability of the subsidy programme as well as how best the 
government could proceed with future reforms. In view of the findings of this study, 
we caution that a successful exit strategy must necessarily accommodate the 
deployment of well-targeted safety nets as well as the evolution of sustainable 
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